Preparation for 24.January meeting

I wrote a short paper outlining Higginbotham's position in his "Sententialism: The Thesis that Complement Clauses Refer to Themselves" and making a few criticisms of it. One puzzle that emerged for any sort of sententialist view is whether, in the context of an interpretive truth theory (like Davidson's as developed by LePore and Ludwig), differences in meaning can all be accounted for by difference in truth-conditions. It seems that they can't -- Ludwig suggests that although differences in meaning will outstrip differences in truth conditions, we can handle it by including in the metalanguage all of those sentences for which we desire M-sentences in the meaning theory. My hunch is that, as that manoeuver doesn't seem to be readily available in most cases of reporting propositional attitudes ("Galileo believed that the earth moves"), in cases where the object language is not included in the metalanguage, only truth conditions are relevant as far as meanings are concerned.